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THE AMERICAN CIVIL JURY FOR
AUSLÄNDER (FOREIGNERS)
NEIL VIDMAR*
I. INTRODUCTION
In an important essay on comparative analysis of civil law, Herbert Bernstein drew attention to the risks of an author misunderstanding procedural law when he or she lacked a fundamental, system-neutral conceptual framework of a country and lacked first-hand
1
experience with the various laws of that country. Herbert and I occasionally talked about this problem of misunderstanding regarding the
American civil jury. In this special issue devoted to the memory of
Professor Bernstein, Paul Carrington has placed the American civil
2
jury into its political context. This Article complements Professor
Carrington’s Article by addressing the empirical issues related to the
actual performance of the American civil jury and the constraints that
the legal system has developed to correct occasional errant decisions
by lay adjudicators.
Legal practitioners and scholars whom I encounter in my travels
outside the borders of the United States frequently challenge me to
explain the “crazy,” “outrageous” system by which we allow groups
3
of untutored lay persons to decide civil disputes. Invariably, they
4
bring up the recent McDonald’s case in which a civil jury in New
Mexico awarded a woman $160,000 in compensatory damages and
$2.7 million in punitive damages just because she spilled coffee on
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2. Paul D. Carrington, The Civil Jury and American Democracy, 13 DUKE J. COMP. &
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3. For a very recent example, see Kevin Sinclair, Fat Chance of Justice for the Real Victims
of Scandals, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 31, 2002, at 15 (reporting inaccurately the McDonald’s case and a number of other unsubstantiated anecdotes about the American tort system).
4. Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309
(D. N.M. Aug. 18, 1994).
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herself.5 My inquisitors are frequently surprised to learn that for
years McDonald’s had kept its coffee many degrees hotter than
home-brewed coffee or the coffee of its competitors; that for over five
years it had been aware of the problem of serious burns resulting
from the coffee through over 700 complaints but had never consulted
a burn specialist, reduced the temperature of its coffee, or warned
consumers; and that the seventy-nine-year-old woman who was injured suffered second and third degree burns to her private parts.6
They are also surprised to learn that the plaintiff had tried to settle
the suit for a much more modest amount before trial, initially around
$20,000 to cover her medical expenses, and that the jury’s punitive
damage award was equal to two days’ worth of the McDonald’s cor7
poration’s profits from selling coffee. Finally, almost everyone is ignorant of the fact that the trial judge subsequently reduced the punitive damage award to $480,000 for a total award of $640,000,8 and that
the case was later settled for an undisclosed, presumably lesser,
9
amount.
One source of misunderstanding in the McDonald’s case is incomplete media reporting about the details of the case. This problem
is endemic with media coverage of jury awards. A number of studies
have carefully documented the fact that mass media newspapers and
television tend to report jury awards selectively, focusing on large
awards, ignoring small awards and defendant verdicts, and not providing complete details about issues put to the juries or matters pre10
ceding trial or following the jury verdict.
In addition, industry
groups generally opposed to the tort system frequently distort infor-

5. See generally Michael McCann et al., Java Jive: Genealogy of a Juridical Icon, 56 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 113 (2001); see also Samuel Gross & Kent Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 4-7 (1996); Nancy S. Marder, Juries and Damages: A Commentary, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 427, 427-29 (1998).
6. See McCann et al., supra note 5, at 121.
7. THOMAS KOENIG & MICHAEL RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 7-8 (2001).
8. Marder, supra note 5, at 429.
9. McCann et al., supra note 5, at 130.
10. STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM
60-91 (1995); KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 7, at 6-8; NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP
POCKETS AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS 11-22 (1995) [hereinafter VIDMAR, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE]; Daniel S. Bailis & Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks With the Media As Your Guide, 80 JUDICATURE 64 (1996); Oscar Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and
Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 771-74 (1995); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts:
An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1159-60 (1996).
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mation about jury awards in order to further their political agendas.11
Moreover, some legal commentators who have made claims about the
legal system12 may be less than informed about the empirical realities
of jury behavior.
I do not suggest that the American civil jury is a perfect institution. Jury decisions are sometimes questionable, but systematic empirical research examining their performance according to various criteria and in the context of the judicial constraints and other dynamics
of the legal system presents a picture quite different from public perceptions both within the United States and abroad.
This brief Article does not present a comprehensive survey of
empirical research. Rather it highlights research that addresses some
of the most misunderstood aspects of the American civil jury system.
The Article first discusses research bearing on jury performance, followed by a discussion of the jury system as it is embedded in the
broader context of procedural law and practice.
II. JURY PERFORMANCE AND BEHAVIOR
A. Agreement Between Judges and Juries
The American civil jury system is often contrasted unfavorably
with the judge-driven systems in continental Europe and elsewhere in
13
the world. In comparison to those systems that usually involve more
than one judge and a process of evidence development that keeps
much of the power in the hands of the judges, the American civil jury
is embedded in an adversarial system of litigation in which the parties
develop the evidence and a single judge presides at trial.14 Moreover,
in contrast to other systems, the American state trial judge is usually
15
elected or at least subject to recall by voters, rather than appointed.

11. See DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 10, at 245.
12. See, e.g., PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES (1988); FRANKLIN STRIER, RECONSTRUCTING JUSTICE: AN AGENDA FOR
TRIAL REFORM (1994).
13. Herbert Bernstein’s article cautioned against facile comparisons between systems and
pointed out that the German system of civil procedure had many “adversarial” components that
many scholars either did not acknowledge or, he suggested, were unaware of. Bernstein, supra
note 1, passim.
14. STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 4
(1984).
15. See generally Carrington, supra note 2, at 89 (noting that “[a]ll American judges are
selected in part because of their political predispositions, and most are accountable in some way
to the people they serve.”).
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Keeping these distinctions in mind we can examine the degree to
which civil jury verdicts differ from how the judge would have decided the case.
In a famous study undertaken in the 1950s, Harry Kalven and
Hans Zeisel asked the presiding judges in approximately 4,000 civil
trials to give their opinions about how they would have decided the
16
case that the jury heard. Kalven and Zeisel then compared each
judge’s response to the jury verdict.17 Judges and juries agreed on the
issue of liability in personal injury cases seventy-nine percent of the
18
time, that is, four cases out of five. The trials involving judge/jury
disagreement were about evenly split between plaintiffs and defen19
dants, contradicting the claim that juries tend to favor plaintiffs.
When plaintiffs prevailed, the jury award was, on average, about
twenty percent higher than what the judge would have awarded.20
Kalven and Zeisel appropriately cautioned that the judge’s decision
should not be considered an absolute criterion of jury performance
since there is no “correct” answer to a trial.21 Nonetheless, their data
did show that, more often than not, judges and juries saw the case the
22
same way.
It is reasonable to be concerned that the findings by Kalven and
Zeisel are a half-century out of date. In the intervening decades civil
lawsuits and trial evidence have, arguably, become more complex.
However, there are contemporary findings consistent with those of
Kalven and Zeisel. Larry Heuer and Steven Penrod persuaded
judges from thirty-three states to provide detailed analyses of a sam23
ple of cases. The judges rated their satisfaction with the jury’s ver24
dict and indicated what their own verdict would have been in each
case.25 The rates of judge and jury agreement were similar to those
26
found by Kalven and Zeisel. Disagreements between judge and jury
were not related to how complex the judge perceived the evidence to
16. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1063 (1964).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1065.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1063.
22. HARRY KALVEN, JR., & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 62-64 (1966).
23. Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its Meaning
and Its Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 32 (1994).
24. Id. at 39.
25. Id. at 46.
26. Id.
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be.27 Heuer and Penrod concluded that “our data do not support the
proposition that judges and juries decide cases differently [or that
trial] complexity influences the rationality of jury decision making . . . .”28 Hannaford et al. studied 153 civil cases from Arizona.
Their research asked the judge to make detailed evaluations of the
trial evidence and to indicate how he or she would have decided the
case. As in the Kalven and Zeisel and Heuer and Penrod studies
there was high agreement between judge and jury. Moreover, the
agreement rate was unaffected by the complexity of the trial or the
number of experts.29 Still another study conducted by the National
Center for State Courts in California found that judicial estimates of
the direction and strength of the evidence were generally consistent
with the jury verdicts.30
B. Other Criteria By Which Jury Performance Can Be Assessed
While the above studies did indicate that the judge/jury disagreements were not due to the difficulty of the case, it is possible
that by combining “simple” cases with “complex” cases, jury misunderstandings were underestimated. In contrast to the run-of-the-mill
car-accident trial that may have only a few witnesses and last no more
than a few days, we must consider the possibility that cases involving
medical malpractice, products liability, numerous plaintiffs or defendants, or multiple weeks of trial may confuse the jury because of the
complexity of the evidence, the sheer quantity of the evidence, or the
31
complexity of the law.
Richard Lempert examined twelve cases that various sources had
32
suggested were complex trials. He drew attention to the fact that
trial length, by itself, is not an adequate measure of trial complexity,
nor is conflicting expert testimony.33 In two of the twelve cases Lempert concluded that the expert evidence was so difficult and so esoteric that only an expert trained in that field could adequately under27. Id. at 48-49.
28. Id. at 49.
29. Paula L. Hannaford et al., Permitting Jury Discussions During Trial: Impact of the Arizona Reform, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 359, 373-75 (2000).
30. G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN ET AL., A COMPARISON OF THE PERFORMANCE OF
EIGHT- AND TWELVE-PERSON JURIES 63-69 (1990).
31. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 23, at 30-31. Judges and legal scholars do not always agree
on what constitutes a complex case.
32. Richard Lempert, Civil Juries in Complex Cases: Taking Stock after Twelve Years, in
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181, 185-89 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
33. Id. at 190.

4(B)VIDMAR_FMT

100

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

09/10/03 4:13 PM

[Vol 13:95

stand it.34 Presumably this would include most judges as well as juries.
In the other cases the esoteric evidence was only peripheral to the
main issues in dispute. Considering each case in its totality, Lempert
concluded that there was no clear evidence of the juries being befuddled; indeed, from a legal scholar’s perspective, the jury verdicts were,
on balance, defensible.35
Medical malpractice trials constitute one category of cases
deemed too complex for juries. Doctors in particular have been
36
Malpractice trials do have at least two
highly critical of juries.
unique aspects. First, the case usually requires that the jurors understand something about the medical condition that brought the patient
to the physician in the first place and the medical procedures used by
the doctor. Second, the actions of the doctor or hospital must be
judged by a standard of medical care. In most personal injury cases
the jury is instructed to judge negligence according to a “reasonable
person” standard, i.e., how did the actions of the defendant compare
with the standards that a reasonable person would employ?37 In contrast, negligence in medical malpractice is judged by a “standard of
medical care,” i.e., what would a reasonable and prudent doctor or
hospital in this particular field of medicine and in this community
38
have done? At trial the jurors have to hear evidence on the standard of medical care and use it to assess the medical provider’s actions. For this reason, doctors, hospitals, and their medical insurance
companies argue that only doctors are competent to understand the
complex medical issues and to determine the appropriate standard of
care.39 Although one might question whether physicians’ self-interest
as members of a guild of health-service providers allows them to be
objective, it is still interesting to consider the statement by the Physician Payment Review Commission in its 1992 report to Congress:
“physicians probably apply the standard [of medical negligence] differently than do juries.”40

34. See id.
35. Id. at 194.
36. VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 10, at 4-5.
37. Id. at 123.
38. Id. at 123-24; Neil Vidmar, Are Juries Competent to Decide Liability in Tort Cases Involving Scientific/Medical Issues? Some Data from Medical Malpractice, 43 EMORY L.J. 885, 896
(1994).
39. See Kirk B. Johnson et al., A Fault-based Administrative Alternative for Resolving
Medical Malpractice Claims, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1365, 1370-71 (1989).
40. PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REV. COMMISSION, ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS, at 186 (1992).
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A study by Mark Taragin and four of his colleagues allows us to
test the Physician Payment Review Commission’s assertion empiri41
cally. Taragin obtained access to liability insurer files for lawsuits
42
that occurred in New Jersey between 1977 and 1992. In each case,
whenever a medical “incident” that might constitute malpractice was
reported to the insurance company, one or more physicians was
summoned to assess the case for negligence.43 The insurance company wanted neutral, objective ratings to determine if attempts
should be made to settle the case or if it should be defended in a
trial.44 These assessments were strictly confidential “work product”
that could not be obtained by the plaintiff or revealed at trial. Of
8,231 cases in the study, 988, or twelve percent, eventually resulted in
a jury verdict.45 Taragin compared the jury verdicts with assessments
of the defendant-physician’s care by an insurance company relying, in
part, on peer review by other doctors and found a correlation between the independently assessed quality of care and the likelihood of
a jury award.46 Plaintiffs won twenty-four percent of the cases that
went to trial, but the verdicts tended to be consistent with the physi47
cian-ratings of negligence. That is, when plaintiffs won, the ratings
tended to favor negligence or were ambiguous; when plaintiffs lost,
the ratings indicated no negligence had occurred or negligence was
uncertain.
The Taragin findings are supported by two additional studies
based on smaller samples of malpractice cases. Henry Farber and
Michelle White studied 465 malpractice cases involving a particular
48
hospital. Like the New Jersey study, the files contained confidential
49
Only twenty-six
assessments of negligence made by physicians.
cases went to jury trial and the hospital prevailed in all but four of

41. Mark I. Taragin et al., The Influence of Standard of Care & Severity of Injury on the
Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 780 (1992).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 780-81.
44. Id. at 782.
45. Id. at 781.
46. Id. at 780-81.
47. Id. at 782.
48. See generally Henry Farber & Michelle White, A Comparison of Formal and Informal
Dispute Resolution in Medical Malpractice, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 777 (1994) [hereinafter Farber &
White, Dispute Resolution in Medical Malpractice]; Henry Farber & Michelle White, Medical
Malpractice: An Empirical Examination of the Litigation Process, 22 RAND J. ECON. 199
(1991).
49. Farber & White, Dispute Resolution in Medical Malpractice, supra note 48, at 787.
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them.50 Two of the plaintiff wins involved cases rated by the experts
as “bad” medical care and the other two were rated as “ambiguous.”51
Thirteen of the remaining cases that were won by the defendants
52
were rated as “good” care and the rest as “ambiguous.” In a third
study, Frank Sloan and his co-authors examined a sample of thirtyseven cases that went to trial in Florida.53 The medical records were
reviewed by panels of doctors working as part of Sloan’s research
team. Of the twenty-four cases in which the plaintiffs prevailed, defendants were twice as likely to have been rated by the independent
54
physicians as negligent. The reverse was true for the thirteen cases
that the plaintiffs lost at trial.55
The other category of trials often deemed to be too complex for
juries is products liability cases. Kip Viscusi studied products liability
56
verdicts in a sample of data from a trade industry organization. He
found that plaintiffs won only thirty-seven percent of cases, a figure
57
that is comparable to that found in other research. His main conclusion about these verdicts was as follows:
Once a claim has reached the court, its outcome rests on the factors
leading to the injury, the nature of the arguments presented, and
the legal doctrine governing the suit. The size of the [injury] loss
has no statistically significant impact on the prospects of a claim, for
58
juries do not appear to be swayed by large and catastrophic losses.

C. Juries and Expert Evidence
Much of the debate about the ability of juries to deal with complex expert testimony that appears in major civil trials is focused upon
scientific techniques and findings that were developed and used in trials in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The rise of DNA evidence and the introduction of epidemiological evidence in asbestos,

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 790-91.
Id. at 795 tbl.6.
Id.
See generally FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1993).
Id. at 167-68.
Id.
W. KIP VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY xii (1991).
See, e.g., STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF
REFORM 169 (1995); Carol J. DeFrances & Marika F.X. Litras, Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in
Large Counties, 1996, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN (September 1999); Theodore
Eisenberg et al., Litigation Outcomes in State and Federal Courts: A Statistical Portrait, 19
SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 433, 447 (1996).
58. VISCUSI, supra note 56, at 51.
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birth defect, and environmental pollution cases provide the best examples.
As part of a study involving medical malpractice litigation, I conducted interviews with jurors who had just finished serving on juries
59
that had decided such cases. The cases involved surgery for urinary
incontinence, a brain-damaged baby, a woman who died from a ruptured bowel, a woman who became blind and alleged failure to make
a timely diagnosis, and a death involving an allergic reaction to a con60
trast dye. All involved expert testimony about causation and all involved battles of experts. In three of the five cases the verdicts favored the defendants.61
Interviews with the jurors in the first four cases indicated that at
least some of the jurors had a basic grasp of the main medical issues
and recognized the basic points of disagreement between the oppos62
ing experts. In the urinary incontinence case, for example, a woman
with severe urinary incontinence undertook elective surgery to sever
63
the nerves to her bladder, a procedure known as a sacral rhizotomy.
She knew in advance that one result of the procedure would be that
for the rest of her life she would have to expel her urine by self64
catheterization, with a risk of frequent urinary tract infections. The
surgery did not correct the urinary incontinence; instead she became
rectally incontinent as well.65 She filed a lawsuit claiming that her
urologist had misdiagnosed the cause of her urinary incontinence,
that the surgeon had not conducted the proper pre-surgery tests and
severed the wrong nerves, and that the surgeon had not fully in66
formed her of the risks of the surgery. The experts disagreed about
“urge” versus “stress” incontinence and how cystometrograms that
measure bladder functioning should be read.67 Regarding the defendant’s performance of the surgery, there was a dispute about nerve
68
blockage. The issue of informed consent pitted the plaintiff’s testimony against that of the surgeon, who claimed he had discussed all of

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 10, at 9.
Id. at 127-60.
Id. at 131, 142, 155.
Id. at 131-32, 136-37, 141-42, 150-51.
Id. at 127-28.
Id. at 129.
Id. at 128.
Id.
Id. at 129-31.
Id. at 128-29.
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the risks.69 The experts on both sides supplemented their oral testimony with numerous charts and graphs.70 In short, the trial had many
of the characteristics that cause doctors to claim that laypersons have
no business deciding medical malpractice cases. After the verdict, my
law students and I interviewed the jurors and discovered that, as a
group, the jurors had a basic intellectual grasp of the case.71 The jurors ascribed their understanding of the issues to clear and repetitive
72
tutoring by the trial witnesses.
None of the malpractice cases allow an unequivocal answer as to
whether the jury reached the “correct” result, but they do clearly
show that the jurors were not passive in evaluating the experts or
their testimony. In most cases, jurors were able to identify basic disagreements between the experts. In the ruptured bowel case several
jurors used the term “hired gun” to describe the plaintiff’s expert, a
73
label that may well have been appropriate in that instance. In the
blindness case, jurors were similarly skeptical of the defendant’s experts based on perceived bias resulting from their collegiality with the
defendant.74 Jurors also considered the absence of evidence and the
incompleteness or convoluted nature of expert testimony.75 Most importantly, the jurors in each case evaluated the testimony in the context of other trial evidence.
In another study of experts, Sonja Kutnjak Ivkovich and Valerie
Hans conducted tape-recorded interviews with fifty-five jurors who
served in civil trials involving medical malpractice, workplace injury,
76
products liability, asbestos, and a motor vehicle accident. The number of experts averaged more than four for each case and the majority
77
were physicians. Ivkovich and Hans found that rather than uncritically accepting expert opinion, most jurors appeared aware that the
experts were called as part of the adversary process and expressed
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 129-30.
Id. at 128-29.
Id. at 131-32.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 150-51.
Id. at 131, 150, 158.
Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovich & Valerie Hans, Jurors and Experts, 16 ADVOCATE: THE
MAGAZINE FOR DELAWARE TRIAL LAWYERS 17, 18-19 (1994) [hereinafter Ivkovich & Hans,
Jurors and Experts]; Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovich & Valerie Hans, Jurors’ Evaluation of Expert Testimony: Judging the Messenger and the Message, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY (forthcoming Spring
2003) (manuscript at 17-19, on file with author and cited by permission of the original authors)
[hereinafter Ivkovich & Hans, Judging the Messenger].
77. Ivkovich & Hans, Jurors and Experts, supra note 76, at 18.
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reservations about them from the outset of the trial.78 The interviews
showed that jurors tended to evaluate experts on the basis of credentials, motives, general impressions, and the content and presentation
of their testimony.79 However, the importance accorded these factors
varied from juror to juror, expert to expert, and case to case.80 The
jurors also offered their views on what constituted good and bad witnesses. Good witnesses were described as good teachers with sound
credentials and acceptable motives for offering their testimony.81 The
jurors’ judgments of what made a bad witness garnered less agreement among the jurors who were interviewed, but they did not ignore
or uncritically accept the testimony of experts.82 Ivkovich and Hans
concluded that:
[W]hen jurors are faced with the difficult task of evaluating evidence that is outside their common knowledge, they rely on sensible techniques: assessing the completeness and consistency of the
testimony and evaluating it against their knowledge of related factors. For especially complex topics, the jury relies on its members
who possess greater familiarity with the subject matter of the expert
83
testimony.

In recent research, my colleagues and I were allowed to videotape the actual deliberations of fifty civil juries in the state of Ari84
zona. The expert testimony in the sample varies from trial to trial
but includes medical testimony about the causes of injuries and their
severity, accident reconstruction, standards of business practices,
amounts of economic losses and other complicated matters. Consistent with the American adversarial procedural system, in almost
every case the contending parties have their own experts who provide
conflicting testimony, often described as the “battle of experts.” Although our analyses of these data are incomplete, our preliminary
findings are very consistent with the conclusions of previous research.85 The jurors question the substantive bases of the experts’
opinions, and they contrast one expert’s opinion with that of an opposing expert or the evidence produced by fact witnesses and circum78. Id. at 20; Ivkovich & Hans, Judging the Messenger, supra note 76, at 63.
79. Ivkovich & Hans, Jurors and Experts, supra note 76, at 19-20.
80. Ivkovich & Hans, Judging the Messenger, supra note 76, at 64.
81. Ivkovich & Hans, Jurors and Experts, supra note 76, at 20-21.
82. Ivkovich & Hans, Judging the Messenger, supra note 76, at 28-29.
83. Ivkovich & Hans, Jurors and Experts, supra note 76, at 20.
84. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Discussion During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript on file with author).
85. For a review of our preliminary findings, see Neil Vidmar & Shari Diamond, Juries and
Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1179-80 (2001).

4(B)VIDMAR_FMT

106

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

09/10/03 4:13 PM

[Vol 13:95

stantial evidence. Arizona jurors are encouraged to ask questions of
witnesses.86 A few examples from as yet unpublished data help to illustrate the attention they often give to expert testimony.
In one case, the plaintiff asserted severe back and leg pain from
an injury. As is not infrequent with plaintiffs, he had pre-existing injuries and health problems. The treating physician and another physician testified for him regarding tests performed and the prescribed
treatment. Here are some of the questions the jurors asked those experts:
Why no medical records beyond the two years prior to the accident? What tests or determination besides subjective patient’s say
so determined [your diagnosis of] a migraine? What exact symptoms did he have regarding a migraine? Why no other tests to rule
out other neurological problems? Is there a measurement for the
amount of seratonin in his brain? What causes seratonin not to
work properly? Is surgery a last resort? What is indothomiacin?
Can it cause problems if you have prostate problems?

In an automobile injury case an overweight plaintiff alleged injury to her knee that required surgery. An accident reconstruction
expert and the plaintiff’s diagnostic radiologist both testified. Jurors
asked the radiologist the following questions:
Did you see the tears in the meniscus? Do you see degeneration in
young people and what about people of the plaintiff’s age? Is a
tear in the meniscus a loosening, lack or gash in the cartilage? Can
you tell the age of a tear due to an injury? Can you see healed tissue in a MRI? Do cartilage tears heal by themselves? Can healed
tears appear younger than they really are?

A defense medical expert in the case was asked: Could the plaintiff have sustained a blunt meniscal tear during the accident? Could
one tear cause another tear? Questions to the plaintiff’s reconstruction expert included the following:
Not knowing how she was sitting or her weight how can you be sure
she hit her knee? Would these factors change your estimate of fifteen feet per second travel speed? If a body in motion stays in motion, and she was continuing motion from prior to the impact, how
did this motion begin and what do you base this on? How tall is the
person who sat in your exemplar car to reconstruct the accident and
how heavy was he? What is the error in your ten miles-per-hour estimate? Is the time of fifty to seventy milliseconds based on an estimate of the size of the dent? Do you conclude that the Olds was
slowed and pushed to the left by the Lincoln and [if so] how would
the plaintiff move to the right and forward?

86. Ariz. R. Civ. Pro. 39(b)(10).
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The above examples are not consistent with an image of unintelligent, passive or credulous jurors. This fact is further demonstrated
by the jurors’ discussions in the jury room. Consider just one example. In a motor vehicle case the jurors used each other as sources to
fill in their own recollection, but this moved into a commentary about
notable aspects of the plaintiff and his physician, drawing upon their
own experiences and information from other witnesses:
[Discussing medical testimony]
Juror 2: When did the independent medical exam occur?
Juror 7: July 1998.
Juror 2: Right.
[All jurors talking at once]
Juror 3: And [plaintiff] had all of those prior injuries he didn’t
disclose.
Juror 2: I thought that was weird. It wasn’t like they had to
go to different doctors. It was all in one file.
Juror 5: It’s not unusual for doctors to disagree.
Juror 7: His [treating doctor’s] ability to treat patients seems
to just prescribe more drugs.
Juror 2: It is just my opinion but [the plaintiff’s] doctor wasn’t
very good, and at least this witness today knew.
Juror 6: I would like to see [the exhibit about his medication]
again. I just want to see what happened after the ac87
cident.

The comment from Juror 6 indicates the updating that jurors
sometimes undertake—they encounter a piece of evidence during the
trial, they consider it further, and then they want to see the material
again in light of what has transpired. Likewise, jurors draw on their
experiences and the evidence they have received.
In short, the data obtained from comparing jury verdicts against
those of judges, medical experts or other criteria, from juror interviews and from our study of the Arizona juries all yield the conclusion
that, in general, civil juries approach the issue of liability with diligence and intelligence. Taken together, the studies lend no support
to critics who claim that juries are incompetent.
D. Jury Bias
Claims are also made that civil juries are biased in favor of plaintiffs and against businesses like McDonald’s. However, statistics indi87. Diamond et al., supra note 84, at 39.
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cate that across the United States defendant doctors win, on average,
almost eight out of ten cases that are decided by juries, and products
liability defendants prevail in about six of ten cases.88 These statistics,
of course, do not speak directly to bias because it could be that the
defendants deserved to win at an even higher rate. Thus, other data
are needed to put these statistics into perspective.
Valerie Hans has conducted the most extensive investigation of
89
the claim that civil juries are biased in favor of plaintiffs. Her re90
search involved claims by individuals against corporate defendants.
Hans conducted extensive interviews with jurors who had decided
these cases, surveys of juror attitudes, and experimental studies that
91
She
manipulated key variables bearing on the bias hypothesis.
found no support for the argument that juries are uniformly sympathetic to plaintiffs who bring claims against businesses, concluding instead that:
[J]urors are often suspicious and ambivalent toward people who
bring lawsuits against business corporations. Jurors and the public
are deeply committed to an ethic of individual responsibility, and
they worry that tort litigation could be fraying the social fabric that
92
depends on a personally responsible citizenry.

Hans also addressed the related claim of anti-business bias. She concluded that:
The jurors . . . did not display the widespread hostility to business
litigants that is commonly asserted. Instead, jurors and the public
supported business as a general rule, and worried about how excessive litigation might detrimentally affect the strength of the business community. Jurors expressed concern . . . [whether an award]
93
might lead to a loss of jobs or otherwise harm the company.

Hans’ conclusions are consistent with the findings of other research94
ers. There is no consistent evidence supporting the claim of jury bias
against businesses or deep pocket defendants, or the obverse claim
88. See, e.g., DeFrances & Litras, supra note 57, at 6 tbl.5.
89. VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY (2000).
90. Id. at 17.
91. Id. at 17-21.
92. Id. at 216.
93. Id. at 217.
94. See VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 10, at 11-45 (documenting low
plaintiff win rates); Robert J. MacCoun, Differential Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries: An Examination of the “Deep Pockets” Hypothesis, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 121, 143 (1996)
(finding that “existing evidence argues against a deep-pocket interpretation of jury patterns”);
Taragin et al., supra note 41, at 783-84 (finding that, in medical malpractice cases, unjustified
judgments against physicians are uncommon).
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that juries decide cases solely out of sympathy for the injured plaintiff.
Our Arizona research indicates that scrutiny of the plaintiff’s
claims takes place not only during the time the witness is testifying,
but also before and after. In one case, a woman injured in an accident
claimed serious back problems. Here is an example of an exchange
that took place in the jury room:
Juror 2: She suffered from the injury.
Juror 4: Now there is only one thing I want y’all to think
about. Every doctor that she had testify said she
could not sit for longer than fifteen minutes after that
accident. Every doctor said that. I want you to know
[waving her notes] that the entire trial from 2 to 3 pm
she did not move in that chair. I took notes as to
every single day. I can tell you exactly how long that
woman sat in her chair the entire trial.
Juror 1: Know something? I was moving more than she was.
She sat like a rock.
[Laughter from other jurors]
Juror 4: Every one of you [jurors] moved. You either crossed
your legs, moved this way, you sat back . . . .

This case was not unusual. In another trial where the plaintiff
claimed a leg injury, jurors noticed that she was wearing high heels
and showed no sign of injury as she stepped off the witness stand. In
still another case, a juror saw the plaintiff smoking during a recess
and said that as a result she was prejudiced against him. The juror
stated that her observation prejudiced her against the plaintiff despite
the objections of two other jurors, one who was a smoker and another
who argued that smoking was not relevant.
E. Assessing Damages
It is jury damage awards that get the attention of the news media
and the public. It is safe to say that the McDonald’s case would have
gained no attention from the media if the award had only been several thousand dollars. Studies indicate that media coverage is heavily
95
skewed toward cases involving large damage awards. Of course, this
skews public perceptions of the jury. In American courts a major distinction is made between compensatory damages—that is, those in-

95. Bailis & MacCoun, supra note 10, at 436; Chase, supra note 10, at 771; Steven Garber
& Anthony Bower, Newspaper Coverage of Automobile Product Liability Reports, 33 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 93, 119-20 (1999).
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tended to compensate an injured party for economic losses and for
pain and suffering—and punitive damages.
In a major study of 1992 verdicts in a sample of the largest urban
state courts, Brian Ostrom and his colleagues concluded that the typi96
cal jury award was “modest.” The median jury verdict, including
punitive damages, was $52,000; however, because of some very high
awards, the arithmetic mean of those awards was much higher,
$455,000.97 About eight percent of awards exceeded $1 million and
the mean amount of the awards varied by case type, with malpractice,
products liability, and toxic torts generating the largest awards on average.98 In contrast, automobile and premises liability cases had much
99
lower awards.
Many of the same jurisdictions were assessed again in 1996.100
The median amount of the jury award for plaintiffs who won at trial
was $35,000, with about nineteen percent of winners receiving over
$250,000, and an estimated seven percent receiving $1 million or
more.101 Of a total of 5,060 jury trials in which the plaintiff prevailed,
there were only 212 cases (about four percent) that resulted in punitive damages.102 Of these, about twenty-two percent involved inten103
tional torts and forty-nine percent involved contract cases. In tort
cases considered as a whole, the median punitive award was $27,000
compared to a median punitive award in contract cases of $76,000.104
Deborah Merritt and Kathryn Barry undertook a very detailed
examination of jury verdicts in the state of Ohio over a twelve-year
105
They concluded that, despite the rhetoric and newspaper
period.
coverage of large awards, win rates in most personal injury claims

96. Brian Ostrom et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil Jury in the 1990s, 79
JUDICATURE 233, 237 (1996).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 238 fig.8.
99. Id.
100. DeFrances & Litras, supra note 88, at 1.
101. Id. at 8 tbl.7.
102. Id. at 8 tbl.7, 10 tbl.9.
103. Id. at 10 tbl.9.
104. Id.
105. Deborah Jones Merritt & Kathryn Ann Barry, Is the Tort System in Crisis? New Empirical Evidence, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 315, 317 (1999) (specifically examining products liability and
medical malpractice cases).
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were low and jury awards were declining.106 Indeed, the amounts
awarded to plaintiffs were relatively small in most cases.107
Mary Rose and I undertook a more detailed examination of pu108
nitive awards in Florida, a state that has a reputation for errant juries.109 Our data included all available punitive damage awards by ju110
ries from 1998 through June 2000. We discovered that there were,
on average, about twenty-three punitive awards per year in Florida,
and that the amount of the punitive damages was, on average, about
two-thirds of the compensatory damages.111 That is, for every dollar
awarded in compensatory damages in these cases an additional sixtyseven cents was awarded in punitive damages. One of the most
striking findings was that despite much discussion regarding the propensity of Florida juries to award punitive damages in products liability cases, during the time period studied only twenty such cases were
submitted to the jury with instructions that they were allowed to consider punitive damages.112 Some of the studied cases involved claims
for asbestos exposure,113 while the remainder, at least on their face,
114
involved claims of egregious conduct by the defendants. Motor vehicle accidents involving impaired or reckless drivers, for example,
constituted over twenty-three percent of all punitive awards.115 For all
cases in which punitive damages were awarded, the median award
was $151,871, and, for the majority of categories of cases, the median
ratio of punitive damages to compensatory awards was at or below
116
Overall, punitive damages did not exceed compensaone to one.
tory awards, suggesting that the punitive awards could have been reasonable.117
In another study of punitive damages verdicts, Theodore Eisenberg and his colleagues concluded that there was no evidence that

106. Id. at 398.
107. Id. at 389-90.
108. Neil Vidmar & Mary R. Rose, Punitive Damages by Juries in Florida: In Terrorem and
in Reality, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487 (2001).
109. See id. at 488-89.
110. Id. at 490-91.
111. Id. at 492-93 tbl.1.
112. Id. at 496. Of those twenty cases, punitive damages were awarded in sixteen. Id.
113. Id. at 496-97. Fifteen of the sixteen cases where punitive damages were awarded related to asbestos injuries. Id.
114. Id. at 494-96.
115. Id. at 495.
116. Id. at 500-01 tbl.3.
117. Id. at 503.
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punitive damages were more likely when individuals sued businesses
than when they sued individuals118 and that juries appeared especially
reluctant to award punitive damages in medical malpractice and
119
products liability cases. They concluded their article by stating that
“[u]nless the case involves an intentional tort or a business-related
tort (such as employment claims), punitive damages will almost never
be awarded.”120
F. Amounts and Variability of Compensatory Awards
Despite the data showing that the average compensatory award
is modest, the data also indicate that many medical malpractice and
121
products liability verdicts do involve very large awards. One of the
first things that a non-American must take into consideration is that,
unlike most other countries, the United States does not have a universal health care system and costs must be borne by the parties or
their insurers. The second issue is that the costs of medical treatment
to a severely injured person can be very large, potentially running to
millions of dollars over the lifetime of a quadriplegic, for example.
Viewed in this light, it should not be a surprise that some jury awards
are very large.
Frank Sloan and Stephen van Wert studied the economics of 187
122
medical malpractice cases in Florida from 1998 and 1999. The cases
123
involved birth and emergency room injuries. Their team of economists interviewed claimants and analyzed their medical and financial
124
The economists’ estimates of the total economic loss rerecords.
sulting from each injury included past and future health care costs,
past and future income losses, and “non-market” losses such as care
for dependent children and income lost by family members who had
to abandon their jobs to care for the injured party.125 The figures were
adjusted to account for insurance benefits and government assis126
tance. For children who survived a birth-related injury, the average
118. Theodore Eisenberg, et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD.
623, 624-25 (1997).
119. Id. at 637.
120. Id. at 659.
121. See, e.g., Vidmar & Rose, supra note 108, at 501 tbl.3.
122. See generally Frank A. Sloan & Stephen S. van Wert, Cost of Injuries, in SUING FOR
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 123 (1993).
123. Id. at 125.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 125-26.
126. Id. at 125.
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total economic loss was estimated at over $1.5 million (in 1989 dollars), with some cases exceeding $2 million.127 The loss to the estates
of those who died as a result of negligence averaged $605,000, and
128
reached $1.3 million for the most seriously injured parties. For persons who died as a result of negligence, the loss to their estate averaged $520,000.129 Sloan and van Wert cautioned that because many
records were missing from the data, their estimates probably “seri130
Of course, the same types of
ously underestimated” the losses.
losses could be expected from negligent injuries from other causes,
such as dangerous products.
The other important finding from the work of Sloan and van
Wert was that there was considerable variability of estimated economic losses between persons, even persons with roughly similar inju131
ries. For example, the economic losses to a twenty-year-old person
would likely be greater than the losses to a sixty-year-old person,
simply because the younger person would be expected to live much
longer. Similarly, the economic losses of a person who earned
$300,000 per year would be greater than those of an otherwise similar
person who earned $30,000 per year.
The conclusions of Sloan and his colleagues speak only indirectly
to the performance of juries. There is no question that estimating
damages is a difficult process, especially because American law allows
monetary compensation for general damages, frequently labeled
132
“pain and suffering.” Michael Saks has cogently pointed to the fact
that experienced insurance claims adjusters show considerable vari133
ability in their valuations of claims. In another study, Gerald Williams provided a group of experienced lawyers with the same case
facts, but randomly assigned the attorneys to the role of plaintiff or

127. Id. at 138 tbl.7.2.
128. Id. at 143 tbl.7.4.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 145.
131. See id. at 168.
132. For reasons that I will not elaborate on here, “pain and suffering” is a misleading term,
since general damages encompass many factors other than just pain. See Neil Vidmar et al.,
Jury Awards and Post-Verdict Adjustments of Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 265, 274
(1998).
133. Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1214-15, 1222 (1992).
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defendant.134 Lawyers representing both sides showed great variability in their valuations of the case.135
In a series of two experiments, my students and I explored jury
performance another way—by comparing the damage awards recommended by lay persons who had been called for jury service with
awards recommended by senior lawyers, including lawyers who had
136
served terms as judges. In the first experiment, the jurors and the
lawyers were presented with a detailed case description of a young
woman who suffered a serious burn and resulting scar on her knee as
a result of medical negligence.137 The materials also contained photographs of the scar.138 The doctor had admitted he was negligent and
conceded medical bills and lost wages, so the only issue was the
amount of money the woman should receive for her pain and suffering and disfigurement.139 The jurors and the senior lawyers did not
140
Howdiffer in the average amount of money that they awarded.
ever, both individual jurors and lawyers showed considerable variability in the amount awarded,141 suggesting that estimating this type
of damage award is a subjective process. Note, however, that jury
awards are the result of combining perspectives from between six and
twelve persons, depending on the particular jurisdiction, while the
award rendered by a judge is by the judge alone. On the other hand,
the judge has the experience of having decided prior cases and has
knowledge of awards rendered by other judges or juries whereas the
jurors have little or no prior experience. Nevertheless, I was able to
use the data to show that it was highly probable that by combining
their individual perspectives, the jury valuation of damages in the
case would be significantly less variable than that of an individual
judge.142 In other words, juries can be expected to be more reliable
than judges in making this decision. My second experiment was
similar in methodology except that the subjects involved a different
set of jurors and lawyers and an injury more serious than the burned
knee.143 The results of this second experiment supported the conclu134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 6 (1983).
Id.
VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 10, at 224.
Id. at 222-24.
Id. at 223.
Id.
Id. at 225 tbl.19.1.
Id.
Id. at 227-28.
Id. at 230.
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sion from the first experiment, that juries would be expected to be
more reliable decision-makers than judges.144
G. Jury Consideration of Insurance and the Effects of Damage
Awards
Is there any validity to the claim that jurors are profligate with
defendants’ or their insurers’ money? Critics of the jury system might
argue that juries are irresponsible because the jurors see the money
award coming from the rich person or corporation and do not consider the aggregate impact of large awards on financial costs that must
be borne by all of society. As a general rule, these claims about jury
profligacy are not only unsupported by systematic research, but findings suggest just the opposite – that juries tend to be very skeptical of
plaintiffs’ claims about damages. As described above, in her research
in cases involving individuals suing business defendants, Valerie Hans
found that jurors were quite concerned about the amount of damages
145
and their impact on the business. I uncovered similar concerns in
my interviews with jurors in medical malpractice cases.146 These basic
conclusions seem well supported by the window into the actual jury
room that is provided by the Arizona jury project.
The Arizona data show a wide concern among jurors about
plaintiffs receiving money that they do not deserve. Here are some
exchanges that took place among two juries:
Jury Example 1:
Juror 5: Every time somebody gets hurt they want to sue
somebody.
Juror 7: I agree.
Juror 5: Nobody wants to take responsibility for their own actions anymore.
Juror 7: Everything is someone else’s fault.
Juror 8: I wonder if he needs assistance anyway . . . .
147
Juror 5: Well, he had insurance.
Jury Example 2:
Juror 6: That is another thing that was not brought up: How
much of this medical has been paid?

144. Id. at 232.
145. See Hans, supra note 89, at 189.
146. VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 10, at 217.
147. Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics,
87 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1877-78 (2001).
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Juror #5: They never tell that.
Juror #3: Insurance usually covers chiropractic care. Why
should we give her above and beyond what she is
probably going to get [for future medical expenses]
148
on her insurance?

The data show that insurance is a common theme in jury discus149
sions. To the apparent surprise of many legal scholars and practitioners, a much larger percentage of discussion involves exchanges
about the possibility that the plaintiff’s medical bills and other losses
are covered by insurance than about whether the defendant has insurance. Jurors often compare the plaintiff’s current health with
health problems that existed prior to the alleged injury or minimize
the impact of the injury on the life of the plaintiff by comparing the
injury with their own life experiences or those of family and friends.
Consider one final example from a trial involving an automobile injury in which the jurors are discussing the plaintiff’s pre-accident
medical condition:
Juror 4: The witness started to say something about her insurance and then dropped it. So there are a lot of things
we may never find out about.
Juror 5: That was a lot of force [that struck plaintiff].
Juror 8: Oh yeah, that’s what I was thinking.
Juror 4: And you know how hard her work is. I have no
doubt this woman has pain.
Juror 8: That whole issue of degenerative disc disease. She
probably has it, but it should not factor in . . . and if
she was in the type of pain she was in yesterday . . .
[referring to a “life in the day of plaintiff” videotape.]
Juror 2: Yes, if that was really her level, geez . . .
Juror 8: I have a friend who is going in for back surgery and
his pain varies from day to day. I mean it will be interesting to watch the whole videotape. Are we going to watch the whole thing?
Juror 3: A lot of people go to work with fused backs.
Juror 1: Doesn’t this degenerative back disease really hurt her
chances? I mean they have not really proved to me
that this was one instance that caused her back problem.

148. Id. at 1891.
149. Id. at 1876.
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Juror 8: Well, I think that at the end the judge will instruct us
on what to consider and what not to, we haven’t seen
the whole thing yet.
Juror 1: I thought the doctor’s testimony was most useful. I
mean, her daughter could never have seen what actu150
ally happened.

H. Judges’ Assessment of Jury Performance
There is a final way of assessing jury performance, namely the
opinions of trial judges who view the performance of the jury system
on a daily basis and over many trials. Surveys show that the vast majority of trial judges give high marks to jury performance. In 1987,
the National Law Journal conducted a survey of 348 state and federal
151
judges regarding their views of juries. Among other questions, the
judges were asked what percentage of the time they disagreed with
jury verdicts in trials over which they had presided. The vast majority
of judges expressed little disagreement with the verdicts.152
Another survey of 800 state and 200 federal judges who spent at
least half their time on civil cases was sponsored by the Aetna Life
and Casualty Company and carried out by Louis Harris and Associ153
Ninety-eight percent of state judges and ninety-nine
ates in 1987.
percent of federal judges indicated they believed that juries make a
“serious effort to apply the law”; a majority did not believe that the
feelings of jurors about the parties often cause them to make inappropriate decisions.154 The judges were also asked if they would like
to see a limitation on the use of juries in complex civil cases involving
155
highly technical and scientific issues. A majority of judges said they
would not like a limitation and a majority was opposed to restrictions
156
on jury trials for “complicated business cases.”
Perry Sentell surveyed samples of state and federal judges in the
157
state of Georgia. Eighty-seven percent of judges indicated that they
150. Diamond et al., supra note 84, at 40.
151. The View from the Bench: A National Law Journal Poll, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 10, 1987, at S2, S-8.
152. Id.
153. Louis Harris & Assocs., Judges’ Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and
Federal Trial Judges who Spend at least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L. REV.
731 (1989).
154. Id. at 746.
155. Id. at 747.
156. Id.
157. R. Perry Sentell, The Georgia Jury and Negligence: The View from the Bench, 26 GA. L.
REV. 85 (1991).
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agreed with the jury verdict in approximately four cases out of five.158
Moreover, even when judges disagreed with the jury, only fourteen
percent indicated that it was their belief that the jury was proplaintiff, and only six percent believed it was because the jury did not
understand the case.159
I.

Outlier Verdicts

Research on general performance of civil juries should not obscure the fact that aberrations do exist. A small minority of juries
make errors in deciding liability or go overboard in awarding damages. We should not expect otherwise. Just as appellate courts sometimes decide that a judge was in error in deciding the law or even in
rendering a decision on the facts, we cannot expect the jury to be an
errorless decision-maker or to never be influenced by passion or
prejudice. Yet, it is this minority of cases that make headlines and influence perceptions of the jury as irresponsible or incompetent.
Sometimes jury awards that are arguably in error are not necessarily the fault of the jury. American litigation takes place in an adversarial atmosphere with each party responsible for developing the
evidence and presenting it under established rules of procedure and
160
Joseph Sanders, for example, conducted a case
evidence at trial.
study of a trial involving the morning sickness drug, Bendectin, that
was alleged to have caused birth defects.161 The jury decided in favor
162
of the plaintiff, but Sanders concluded that the jury was wrong.
Sanders observed that the problem was not necessarily the fault of
the members of the jury, but instead resulted from “both the judicial
instructions and the evidentiary rules concerning the admissibility of
research articles.”163 In research on medical malpractice cases, I discovered that in a number of instances, the defendant argued the case
around liability and, in contrast to the plaintiff, said very little about
damages.164 In final instructions before deliberation, the judge instructs jurors that they are legally required to decide the case only on

158. Id. at 116 tbl.1.
159. Id. at 116-17.
160. See generally LANDSMAN, supra note 14; ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL
LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001).
161. Joseph Sanders, The Jury Deliberation in a Complex Case: Havener v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 45 (1993).
162. Id. at 65.
163. Id.
164. VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 10, at 83-84.
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the evidence introduced during the trial.165 Since jurors heard only estimates of damages from the plaintiff, they were bound to make their
decision based on that evidence.166 In interviews after the trial some
jurors expressed dissatisfaction because they believed that the plaintiff’s figures were too high but they felt bound to follow the judge’s
instructions and award damages based on the plaintiff’s damage esti167
mates.
On the other hand, it is also likely that, on occasion, jury awards
are rendered out of passion or prejudice or perhaps just incompe168
tence. Some highly suspicious verdicts involving multi-million dollar compensatory awards in medical malpractice cases are docu169
Although the alleged behavior of the
mented in another article.
medical professionals in these cases presents grounds for jurors (or
any other person) to feel anger towards the defendants, the huge
compensatory damage awards are difficult to defend. Errant jury
verdicts, and even some that are not so errant, are embedded in a
wider system of formal and informal controls that corrects the errors.
This is often not recognized by persons outside the American legal
system—or indeed the American public.
III. THE JURY SYSTEM EMBEDDED IN A SYSTEM
OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL CONTROLS
A primary element in the system of controls is the fact that a jury
verdict does not become a valid verdict unless the trial judge, who
also heard the evidence, agrees and enters a formal judgment in the
case. As occurred in the McDonald’s case, the judge has the power to
reduce the award through a legal device called remittitur. Remittitur
gives the plaintiff the option of accepting a lowered award or asking
for a new trial.170 A new jury trial is a costly and risky undertaking
because the jury in the second trial may be very stingy with damages
165. Id. at 188-89.
166. Id. at 240-41.
167. Id. at 241.
168. See Steve Cohen, Malpractice: Behind a $26-Million Award to a Boy Injured in a Surgery, in Vidmar, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 10 at 95 (examining the likelihood of
such an incident in a medical malpractice case).
169. Vidmar et al., supra note 132, at 287-90.
170. David Fink, Best v. Taylor Machine Works, the Remittitur Doctrine, and the Implications for Tort Reform, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 227, 227 (1999). Some judicial decisions have placed
limitations on the extent to which the trial judge may reduce awards. See Note, Remittitur
Abolished as an Unnecessary Practice Leading to Inconsistent Results, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 271,
276 (1986).
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or even decide the defendant is not liable. Additionally, the judge
may even set aside all or part of the liability verdict or damages and
order a new trial if he or she decides that the evidence did not justify
the verdict. Further, the losing party always has the option of appealing the verdict to a higher court.
These formal mechanisms are accompanied by a system of more
informal processes. In post-verdict negotiations, the plaintiff often
settles for an amount less than the verdict. One reason is that if the
defendant appeals the case, the plaintiff faces a long and costly appeal
process. Even if the plaintiff eventually prevails on all matters, he or
she may not receive the money for many years. Additionally, in many
instances the award, even if justified on the facts, may be in excess of
the defendant’s insurance coverage or other assets. Even though they
could potentially do so, plaintiffs’ lawyers are extremely reluctant to
171
foreclose on assets of the defendant. In most instances their reluctance was reported as a basic sense that foreclosure would be unfair.172
Additionally, such aggressive action could potentially redound negatively on the lawyer’s reputation.
A “high-low” agreement is another informal, presumably recent,
development in litigation that takes place before or even during
173
trial. In such arrangements the parties stipulate that if the jury decides in favor of the defendant or awards damages below a certain
specified amount, the plaintiff will receive the low amount specified
by the agreement.174 On the other hand, if the award exceeds an
agreed high amount, the defendant will pay no more than that speci175
fied high amount. Such agreements protect some of the interests of
both parties—the plaintiff will receive some money and the defendant
is protected against a very large award. These agreements may occur
in advance of trial when the parties cannot reach agreement on the
amount of a settlement and decide to let the jury determine damages
while still protecting both parties’ interests. Additionally, sometimes
during trial the evidence proceeds in unexpected ways, creating uncertainty about the verdict and causing the parties to become risk
averse and reevaluate the strength of their respective cases.

171. Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money and Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 75, 285 (2001).
172. Id.
173. See Steven R. Gabel, High/Low Settlement Agreements: Method for Dispute Resolution,
73 MICH. BAR J. 74, 74-75 (1994).
174. Id. at 74.
175. Id.
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Typically, neither trial judges nor juries are aware of the existence of high-low agreements. Parties are not required to disclose the
agreement to anyone; indeed, parties usually specify that such agreements are confidential. Similarly, any post-verdict settlement between the parties is usually accompanied by a confidentiality clause.
The secrecy of settlements prevents accurate assessments of the extent of post-, pre-, or mid-trial agreements that alter the amount provided for by the verdict or the precise means by which such settlements are reached.
There is some research that provides a window into these verdict
adjustment processes. For example, Ivy Broder reviewed a sample of
198 jury awards of $1 million or more that occurred between 1984 and
176
1985. In just slightly more than a quarter of the cases, the plaintiff
received the entire award.177 However, on average the final amount
178
Similarly,
was fifty-seven percent lower than the original verdict.
Michael Shanley and Mark Peterson researched a sample of 161 verdicts from Cook County, Illinois (Chicago) and concluded that the
payout of the awards was reduced in a significant number of cases,
but did not provide more details.179
Felicia Gross, Mary Rose, and I examined post-trial adjustments
of jury awards in samples of medical malpractice cases from New
180
York, Florida, and California. Like the other researchers, we found
substantial evidence of post-trial adjustments of awards, even though
our data allowed only a very conservative estimate of those adjustments.181 We found that the very large “outlier verdicts” were ad182
justed the most. In some of the larger verdicts, the plaintiff eventually settled for an amount that was less than ten percent of the
award.183
I also documented post-verdict adjustments in a recent study of
medical malpractice cases in Pennsylvania that were closed between

176. Ivy E. Broeder, Characteristics of Million Dollar Awards: Jury Verdicts and Final Disbursements, 11 JUST. SYS. J. 349, 350 (1986).
177. Id. at 353.
178. Id.
179. MICHAEL G. SHANLEY & MARK A. PETERSON, POSTTRIAL ADJUSTMENTS TO JURY
AWARDS viii (1987).
180. Vidmar et al., supra note 132, at 280-81.
181. Id. at 298.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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1999 and 2001.184 A substantial number of cases had high-low agreements in which the high amount was substantially below what the jury
awarded.185 In other cases the parties negotiated settlements after the
186
verdict was rendered. Of twenty-two cases involving jury verdicts of
$5 million or more, the final payment to the plaintiffs ranged between
six percent and forty-six percent of the jury verdict, with the average
settlement being twenty-two percent of the jury award.187 As in previous research, the largest awards tended to be reduced the most.188
IV. CONCLUSION
A substantial body of systematic empirical studies indicates that
the American civil jury system is not as erratic or unreasonable as
portrayed in the media. Whether it involves issues of liability, responses to experts, attention to the judge’s instructions or damage
awards, the civil jury performs much better than many people believe.
If this were not so, surely the civil jury would have been abandoned,
or at least drastically curtailed, despite the guarantee of the right to
jury trial in the U.S. Constitution and the constitutions of individual
states. American society could not afford the caprice and craziness
ascribed to juries. Examined from this pragmatic perspective, it
should not be surprising that the empirical research into the performance of the civil jury yields a generally positive picture, especially
when considered in the context of the formal and informal controls
189
on errant verdicts.
Taken along with the civil jury system’s political and symbolic
roles that Professor Carrington discusses in this volume, I hope this
brief review helps to correct some fundamental misunderstandings
about the civil jury. I offer it in the spirit of informed comparative

184. Neil Vidmar, Juries and Jury Verdicts in Medical Malpractice Cases: Implications for
Tort Reform in Pennsylvania (Jan. 28, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
[hereinafter Vidmar, Juries and Jury Verdicts]; see also Neil Vidmar, Tort Reform and the Medical Liability Insurance Crisis in Mississippi: Diagnosing the Disease and Prescribing a Remedy,
22 MISS. C. L. REV. (forthcoming Fall 2002) (manuscript at 33, on file with author).
185. Vidmar, Juries and Jury Verdicts, supra note 184, at 18.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See id.
189. Careful students of the civil justice system agree that it is not always a very efficient
system of resolving disputes or providing compensation to persons injured by the negligence or
misdeeds of another. However, the inefficiencies are often ones that prevent injured persons
from being compensated rather than inefficiencies involving overcompensation. See Saks, supra
note 133, at 1287-88.
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civil procedure that my wise, scholarly colleague and dear friend
Herbert Bernstein drew to our attention.

